I always find it frustrating that even the dynamical systems people so rarely cite the long tradition of loopy approaches to human behavior in Buddhism.
"A Buddhist intellectual virtue can allow us to hold all this is in a useful way. It suggests that maybe the origin of the mind/body problem lies in trying to constitute two worlds as given in the first place. "
True. I often go back to the old adage, "there's nothing new under the sun" - often our seemingly novel scientific insights are just a more technical repackaging of (very) old ideas.
Fair point, but I think the topic is less about the difference between mind and body, but between the body and the rest of the world. Which I know some Buddhists also believe there is no real distinction. But practically speaking, we all still operate as individuals, and have separate thoughts that we cannot share instantaneously and perfectly.
Beyond just thinking through my fingers, I think through other parts of my body. I feel emotions first in my body -- anxiety in my stomach, anger in my temples, excitement in my heartbeat. I often think and feel differently when I run, or when I listen to music-- especially when I play music, or dance. This is even different than singing with the lyrics. There's something special about embodying the ideas of the notes and the lyrics by using my hands to strum the guitar, or my feet to dance to the beat.
Still, I would say that all of these are external supplements to my cognition, not part of my cognition itself. Just as drugs can alter my cognition-- reliably so, as in the case of my daily coffee. Still, I don't think it would be fair to call it part of my cognition.
Regarding the second point about "beliefs," I agree with you that accuracy (or precision) of a term is more important than how broadly it can be used. The more meanings a word carries, the more diluted its meaning, the more confusing its usage. Which just requires more words to clarify. Which in their case, takes a whole essay. We don't typically use "belief" in the sense that they try to, so trying to add alternative meanings is seemingly counterproductive.
Still, as you say, a provocative and playful thought experiment that helps us consider the problem of cognition.
According to my dictionary interpretation is an action. Belief is an acceptance that something is true or exists.
You can interpret the building and contents at 53rd St. but you can't if you don't believe it exists. So, it's a process you believe and then interpret.
I agree that interpretation is an action, but as I see it, assigning a 'true/false' label to something *is* interpretation. If I believe something it just means that I've interpreted it as true.
In my mind, the process is something like: 1. acquire new information, 2. interpret that information (as true/false, important/unimportant, etc.), 3. store the information with that interpretation. If I believe something, it just means that I interpreted it as true at stage 2.
I haven't thought enough about UFOs to have a strong opinion, to be honest. I do suspect that there are other lifeforms out there, but whether those lifeforms are 'intelligent' to the degree that humans are is hard to say. If they are, then it's possible that UFOs really are advanced spacecrafts piloted by aliens; if not, the UFO phenomenon is more likely a combination of drug or schizo-induced hallucination and/or regular aircrafts/satellites mistaken for alien tech. Probably not demons or angels - I don't think spiritual beings operate on the physical plain in that sort of way.
I don't think my definition of 'interpretation' necessarily leads to epistemic or moral relativism. Two people might interpret a piece of information in different ways, but that doesn't mean either interpretation is valid. Say I tried to look up the location of MOMA and Google told me it was on 51st Street - I trust Google's location data enough that I wouldn't question this, and would interpret this information as true, but it doesn't change the fact that, in the real world, MOMA is located on 53rd. My interpretation is simply incorrect due to faulty information.
I'm not sure what your question is, exactly, but to put it in the terms I used in the comment above, my understanding of the trans phenomenon is something like this:
1. acquire new information (I'm experiencing some incongruity between my biological sex and my internal and/or social experience of my gender),
2. interpret that information (society has a pre-established category for this phenomenon called 'gender dysphoria'),
3. store the information with that interpretation (I am a woman in a man's body).
Now if your question is whether this is a valid interpretation/conclusion for someone to draw from this information, it's hard to say. I think the current trans phenomenon has multiple causes. There's the experience of genuine gender dysphoria, the distressing feeling that one's felt sense of their gender doesn't match their biological sex; for some people gender seems to be a performative thing, where they choose to identify (or not identify) as their birth sex to defy traditional norms; and then there is the more controversial notion that people can be convinced (so to speak) into being trans when they really aren't, perhaps in order to fit in/seek social validation or find a concrete identity. The latter might be seen in people with ASD, severe trauma, BPD, etc. - this theory is by no means popular, but I know many psychiatrists/psychologists/other mental health professionals who believe this is a factor in the current transgenderism wave.
My problem with it is that part of the data is the desire to be treated in a more advantageous way. By changing from a man to a woman you can more easily compete in sports since you still have a man's body. Second, following the rise of gay rights and prestige after the AIDS crisis you can exploit the modrern concept of human rights in that you are a victim of discrimination. Your rights – privilege without obligation – are being violated, e.g. you can't use a girl's bathroom, and therefore you are entitled to special treatment. You are a parasite meaning you don't have to do anything other than be born.
It's all a parasitical strategy to acquire power based on something called human rights which don't exist. Have you ever seen a right? I haven't.
Interesting essay. Though on something of a quick skim, and on reading your review, I kinda think that one or both of the authors are somewhat guilty of the charge leveled by Nietzsche: muddying the waters to make them seem deep. Seems the shorter summation of their thesis -- amused to see this qualification therein: "Authors are listed in order of degree of belief in the central thesis" -- is that there's a difference between a tool and the users of it.
Though, given that our brains have their own "Laws of Thought" -- as George Boole put it -- one might admit to some "perplexity" as to where the dividing line really is between tool and tool-user. But, in a practical sense, the skull seems a useful one -- I doubt that either Clarke or Chalmers would argue that a dead person is still thinking because the computers they used are still adding numbers and rotating shapes.
In any case, Chalmers at least has had some interesting perspectives -- been following his peregrinations for the last 15 years since his "The Conscious Mind" -- highly recommended, not least for his amusingly trenchant observations. Particularly charmed by this bit therefrom:
DC: " The International Dictionary of Psychology does not even try to give a straightforward characterization [of consciousness]: 'Consciousness: The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self-consciousness – to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it. (Sutherland 1989) [pg. 3]' ...."
A refreshing bit of honesty at least.
And, ICYMI, you might also enjoy this paper by Chalmers on "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness", particularly his dichotomy between structure and dynamics [AKA, processes]:
DC: "But the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics, so structures and functions are all we can expect these processes to explain. The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience may arise from the physical, but it is not entailed by the physical."
Been some years since I read that, and there's been some water under the bridge since then. But I've kind of reached the "conclusion" that he's barking up the wrong tree, at least to some extent: consciousness IS the process, though it is, of course, moot which processes "entail" consciousness, and which ones don't -- maybe they all do? ... 😉🙂
But in that same vein, you might take a gander at the Wikipedia article on processes:
Wikipedia: "Process philosophy, also ontology of becoming, or processism, is an approach in philosophy that identifies processes, changes, or shifting relationships as the only real experience of everyday living."
Some venerable history to the perspective, one which is acquiring increasing currency in the philosophy of science, particularly in its increasing reliance on the concept of mechanisms. ICYMI, my defense and use of the concept in the context of biology based on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on "Mechanisms in Science":
On the authors "muddying the waters to seem deep" - you may be right, but I think another way to view this is that the authors wrote this knowing that the idea is a bit far-fetched. The note about each author having different 'degrees of belief' in the thesis seems to back this up. I think they had a fun idea and wanted to see how far they could push it, but at the same time knew that they were going beyond what most people would accept.
I agree that the skull, or at best the skin if we are willing to accept 'embodied cognition', is a reasonable place to set the boundary of mental processing. Your example - "I doubt that either Clarke or Chalmers would argue that a dead person is still thinking because the computers they used are still adding numbers and rotating shapes." - is a very good way to show this!
I actually haven't read much of Chalmers' work outside of this essay, but I intend to do so at some point. I've been a bit hesitant to write about 'consciousness' because it's such a big topic, and I don't think I have much to add beyond what others have said up to this point. But maybe that will change once I've read more of his works.
Thanks for sharing these links - I'll have a look!
I always find it frustrating that even the dynamical systems people so rarely cite the long tradition of loopy approaches to human behavior in Buddhism.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/#DynaSystApprCogn
"A Buddhist intellectual virtue can allow us to hold all this is in a useful way. It suggests that maybe the origin of the mind/body problem lies in trying to constitute two worlds as given in the first place. "
https://www.buddhistinquiry.org/article/buddhism-body-mind-problem/
True. I often go back to the old adage, "there's nothing new under the sun" - often our seemingly novel scientific insights are just a more technical repackaging of (very) old ideas.
Fair point, but I think the topic is less about the difference between mind and body, but between the body and the rest of the world. Which I know some Buddhists also believe there is no real distinction. But practically speaking, we all still operate as individuals, and have separate thoughts that we cannot share instantaneously and perfectly.
The cartoon is by Rube Goldberg.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rube_Goldberg
Good to know, thank you! I'll update the description.
Interesting topic. Thank you for elucidating it.
Beyond just thinking through my fingers, I think through other parts of my body. I feel emotions first in my body -- anxiety in my stomach, anger in my temples, excitement in my heartbeat. I often think and feel differently when I run, or when I listen to music-- especially when I play music, or dance. This is even different than singing with the lyrics. There's something special about embodying the ideas of the notes and the lyrics by using my hands to strum the guitar, or my feet to dance to the beat.
Still, I would say that all of these are external supplements to my cognition, not part of my cognition itself. Just as drugs can alter my cognition-- reliably so, as in the case of my daily coffee. Still, I don't think it would be fair to call it part of my cognition.
Regarding the second point about "beliefs," I agree with you that accuracy (or precision) of a term is more important than how broadly it can be used. The more meanings a word carries, the more diluted its meaning, the more confusing its usage. Which just requires more words to clarify. Which in their case, takes a whole essay. We don't typically use "belief" in the sense that they try to, so trying to add alternative meanings is seemingly counterproductive.
Still, as you say, a provocative and playful thought experiment that helps us consider the problem of cognition.
Thanks for the comment, Grant - sounds like we're on the same page with this one!
According to my dictionary interpretation is an action. Belief is an acceptance that something is true or exists.
You can interpret the building and contents at 53rd St. but you can't if you don't believe it exists. So, it's a process you believe and then interpret.
I agree that interpretation is an action, but as I see it, assigning a 'true/false' label to something *is* interpretation. If I believe something it just means that I've interpreted it as true.
In my mind, the process is something like: 1. acquire new information, 2. interpret that information (as true/false, important/unimportant, etc.), 3. store the information with that interpretation. If I believe something, it just means that I interpreted it as true at stage 2.
Thanks. What about UFOs? Are they demons and angels or material in this world?
The problem I see with your definition is that it leads to solipsism in that there is no truth, no absolutes, only infinite interpretations.
Or relativism, the doctrine that knowledge, truth, and morality exist in relation to culture, society, or historical context, and are not absolute.
I haven't thought enough about UFOs to have a strong opinion, to be honest. I do suspect that there are other lifeforms out there, but whether those lifeforms are 'intelligent' to the degree that humans are is hard to say. If they are, then it's possible that UFOs really are advanced spacecrafts piloted by aliens; if not, the UFO phenomenon is more likely a combination of drug or schizo-induced hallucination and/or regular aircrafts/satellites mistaken for alien tech. Probably not demons or angels - I don't think spiritual beings operate on the physical plain in that sort of way.
I don't think my definition of 'interpretation' necessarily leads to epistemic or moral relativism. Two people might interpret a piece of information in different ways, but that doesn't mean either interpretation is valid. Say I tried to look up the location of MOMA and Google told me it was on 51st Street - I trust Google's location data enough that I wouldn't question this, and would interpret this information as true, but it doesn't change the fact that, in the real world, MOMA is located on 53rd. My interpretation is simply incorrect due to faulty information.
Thanks for your response,
What about men who think they're women? They want to and do compete in women's sports, among other things.
I'm not sure what your question is, exactly, but to put it in the terms I used in the comment above, my understanding of the trans phenomenon is something like this:
1. acquire new information (I'm experiencing some incongruity between my biological sex and my internal and/or social experience of my gender),
2. interpret that information (society has a pre-established category for this phenomenon called 'gender dysphoria'),
3. store the information with that interpretation (I am a woman in a man's body).
Now if your question is whether this is a valid interpretation/conclusion for someone to draw from this information, it's hard to say. I think the current trans phenomenon has multiple causes. There's the experience of genuine gender dysphoria, the distressing feeling that one's felt sense of their gender doesn't match their biological sex; for some people gender seems to be a performative thing, where they choose to identify (or not identify) as their birth sex to defy traditional norms; and then there is the more controversial notion that people can be convinced (so to speak) into being trans when they really aren't, perhaps in order to fit in/seek social validation or find a concrete identity. The latter might be seen in people with ASD, severe trauma, BPD, etc. - this theory is by no means popular, but I know many psychiatrists/psychologists/other mental health professionals who believe this is a factor in the current transgenderism wave.
Thabks for your thoughtful comment.
My problem with it is that part of the data is the desire to be treated in a more advantageous way. By changing from a man to a woman you can more easily compete in sports since you still have a man's body. Second, following the rise of gay rights and prestige after the AIDS crisis you can exploit the modrern concept of human rights in that you are a victim of discrimination. Your rights – privilege without obligation – are being violated, e.g. you can't use a girl's bathroom, and therefore you are entitled to special treatment. You are a parasite meaning you don't have to do anything other than be born.
It's all a parasitical strategy to acquire power based on something called human rights which don't exist. Have you ever seen a right? I haven't.
Interesting essay. Though on something of a quick skim, and on reading your review, I kinda think that one or both of the authors are somewhat guilty of the charge leveled by Nietzsche: muddying the waters to make them seem deep. Seems the shorter summation of their thesis -- amused to see this qualification therein: "Authors are listed in order of degree of belief in the central thesis" -- is that there's a difference between a tool and the users of it.
Though, given that our brains have their own "Laws of Thought" -- as George Boole put it -- one might admit to some "perplexity" as to where the dividing line really is between tool and tool-user. But, in a practical sense, the skull seems a useful one -- I doubt that either Clarke or Chalmers would argue that a dead person is still thinking because the computers they used are still adding numbers and rotating shapes.
In any case, Chalmers at least has had some interesting perspectives -- been following his peregrinations for the last 15 years since his "The Conscious Mind" -- highly recommended, not least for his amusingly trenchant observations. Particularly charmed by this bit therefrom:
DC: " The International Dictionary of Psychology does not even try to give a straightforward characterization [of consciousness]: 'Consciousness: The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self-consciousness – to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it. (Sutherland 1989) [pg. 3]' ...."
A refreshing bit of honesty at least.
And, ICYMI, you might also enjoy this paper by Chalmers on "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness", particularly his dichotomy between structure and dynamics [AKA, processes]:
DC: "But the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics, so structures and functions are all we can expect these processes to explain. The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience may arise from the physical, but it is not entailed by the physical."
https://consc.net/papers/facing.html
Been some years since I read that, and there's been some water under the bridge since then. But I've kind of reached the "conclusion" that he's barking up the wrong tree, at least to some extent: consciousness IS the process, though it is, of course, moot which processes "entail" consciousness, and which ones don't -- maybe they all do? ... 😉🙂
But in that same vein, you might take a gander at the Wikipedia article on processes:
Wikipedia: "Process philosophy, also ontology of becoming, or processism, is an approach in philosophy that identifies processes, changes, or shifting relationships as the only real experience of everyday living."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process_philosophy
Some venerable history to the perspective, one which is acquiring increasing currency in the philosophy of science, particularly in its increasing reliance on the concept of mechanisms. ICYMI, my defense and use of the concept in the context of biology based on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on "Mechanisms in Science":
https://humanuseofhumanbeings.substack.com/p/rerum-cognoscere-causas
https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/win2021/entries/science-mechanisms/#toc
And, ICYMI, you might note my earlier use of the Rube Goldberg "Self-Operating Napkin" to illustrate the principles involved ... 😉🙂
On the authors "muddying the waters to seem deep" - you may be right, but I think another way to view this is that the authors wrote this knowing that the idea is a bit far-fetched. The note about each author having different 'degrees of belief' in the thesis seems to back this up. I think they had a fun idea and wanted to see how far they could push it, but at the same time knew that they were going beyond what most people would accept.
I agree that the skull, or at best the skin if we are willing to accept 'embodied cognition', is a reasonable place to set the boundary of mental processing. Your example - "I doubt that either Clarke or Chalmers would argue that a dead person is still thinking because the computers they used are still adding numbers and rotating shapes." - is a very good way to show this!
I actually haven't read much of Chalmers' work outside of this essay, but I intend to do so at some point. I've been a bit hesitant to write about 'consciousness' because it's such a big topic, and I don't think I have much to add beyond what others have said up to this point. But maybe that will change once I've read more of his works.
Thanks for sharing these links - I'll have a look!